## 1NC

### Off

#### Environmental reformism is merely an exercise in blame shifting and assuaging guilt, shielding us from ever having to take responsibility for our own personal complicity in the environmental crisis

**Bobertz, 95** (Bradley, Nebraska Law, Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 711)

A routine pattern in environmental lawmaking is a tendency to blame environmental problems on easily identifiable objects or entities rather than on the social and economic practices that actually produce them. [n17](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n17) Once identified as the culprit of an environmental problem, this blame-holder comes to symbolize and embody the problem itself. Lawmaking then begins to resemble a re-enactment of a scapegoat ritual, in which the community's misfortunes are symbolically transferred to an entity that is then banished or slain in order to cleanse the community of its collective wrongdoing and remove the source of its adversity. The topic of scapegoating is commonly encountered in studies of racism, [n18](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n18) family psychology, [n19](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n19) and mass sociology, [n20](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n20) but is not often associated with law and legal scholarship. Nevertheless, parallels appear to exist between the general scapegoat phenomenon and environmental lawmaking.The term "scapegoat" derives from the guilt offerings ceremony set forth in the biblical book of Leviticus. According to the Levitical  [\*717]  scapegoat ceremony, Aaron placed both hands on the head of a live goat and confessed the sins of the people of Israel. [n21](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n21) Having thereby transferred the collective guilt of the people to the goat, he drove the goat into the desert "to carry off their iniquities to an isolated region." [n22](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n22) This ceremony was to be repeated each year on the Day of Atonement. Other sacrifice rituals, including the "sin offering for the community" [n23](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n23) and the "guilt offerings," [n24](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n24) were to be performed on a periodic basis. Essentially identical, [n25](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n25) these other ceremonies involve the slaying of a young bull as a means for forgiving inadvertent transgressions of the people. [n26](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n26)Other cultures also employ similar sacrifice rituals to expunge evils brought about by the collective misconduct of the community. Beginning with James Frazer's The Golden Bough, [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n27) anthropologists have catalogued a remarkable variety of sacrifice rituals intended to expel collective sin. [n28](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n28) Despite subtle variations in form and emphasis, these ceremonies follow a remarkably similar pattern: the participants view the ritual as a necessary measure for expelling collective wrongdoing, often after some misfortune or calamity has befallen the community. [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n29) Often, both the transference of the community's sins to the scapegoat object and the sacrifice of the object itself are performed by persons having special standing in the community, typically of a religious character. [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n30) [\*718]  While we might view these sacrifice rituals as acts of merely symbolic import, the participants themselves clearly believe the ceremonies accomplish their desired ends. The people of Southern Africa do not place the blood of their sick people on the head of a goat (which is then banished to the veldt) to engage the curiosity of European anthropologists. They simply intend to make sick people well. [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n31) Likewise, the people put to death in Salem were killed because they were thought (proven!) to be witches, not because they were personifications of some other social anxiety. [n32](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n32) To the detached observer, the bizarre and gruesome aspects of the ceremonies may stand out, but the participants do what they do because they believe it will work. [n33](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n33)This Article is not intended to support the notion that the targets of environmental regulation, in one way or another, are "scapegoats" in the common understanding of the term -- deserving of pity and freedom from compliance with environmental laws. Instead, I intend to shed light on a simple but troubling pattern: Environmental legislation is more likely to emerge from the lawmaking process when the problem it seeks to control is readily symbolized by an identifiable object, entity, or person -- a "scapegoat" in the sense discussed above. In the absence of such a scapegoat, however, lawmakers are less likely to take action. This pattern is particularly problematic because the identified scapegoat often bears an incomplete or distorted relationship to the actual problem at hand, resulting in laws that are likewise incomplete or distorted. As discussed below in Part V, because we deal harshly with culturally accepted symbols of environmental problems, it is less likely that we will deal with the problems (and their causes) themselves. For anyone concerned about the correlation between social problems and the legal regimes we create to solve them, this phenomenon should be cause for concern.

#### Additionally, the Affirmative’s production centered focus impoverishes our understanding of the environmental crisis, diminishing our ability to understand and respond to the consumptive practices that create pollution.

Princen, 3 (Thomas, Global Environmental Politics, February)

Research within the economic strands of social science disciplines such as political science, sociology, and anthropology has been preponderantly in the "environmental improvement" category. Pollution control, environmental movements, and environmental organizations are common topics. At the same time that social science has focused on environmental improvement, those who chart biophysical trends say incremental change is not enough. Every time a "state of the environment" report comes out, authors call for a fundamental shift in how humans relate to nature. Some call for global citizenship, others for spiritual awakening. But nearly all call for a drastic overhaul of the current economic system, a system that is inherently and uncontrollably expansionist, that depends on ever-increasing throughput of material and energy, that risks life-support systems for humans and other species. They call, in short, for transformational change, what I have put in the category of sustainability. And, then, the best prescriptions these analysts, who largely are not students of human behavior, come up with are better information, greater efficiencies, more public participation and, for specific measures, new taxes and subsidies -- all classic marginal tinkering. If the social sciences are going to make a contribution that is commensurate with the severity of biophysical trends, it must do better than analyze environmental improvement measures. Social scientists must develop analytic tools for the analyst (biophysical and social alike) and an effective vocabulary for the policy maker and activist that allow, indeed encourage, an escape from well-worn prescriptions that result in marginal change at best. Among those tools are norms and principles consonant with critical environmental threats. To promote alternative normative goals -- e.g., human security through an economy that respects natural limits, an economy that is sensitive to overconsumption -- the focus must change from producing goods (goods are good so more goods must be better) to consumption, not just purchasing, so-called "demand," but to consuming*,* using up, diminishing regenerative capacity, engendering irreversibilities and non-substitutabilities. n3 Global water management illustrates the need for such a focus.

#### Consumption is the root cause of the Affirmative harms and constitutes a systemic harm that not only outweighs the case, but creates the possibility of extinction

Dauvergne, 5 (Peter, “Dying of Consumption: Accidents or Sacrifices of Global Morality?” Global Environmental Politics, August)

Private consumption expenditures are now more than 4 times higher than in 1960. The globalization of ever-more growth and consumption has come, however, at a price: global chains of cause-and-effect that obscure social, environmental and ethical responsibility. The result in practice is a global order that accepts the deaths of millions of young people in dangerous and unhealthy environments as tragic, but largely unavoidable, accidents of economic progress. The history of what most call traffic "accidents" is revealing. The hope at the 1896 inquest into the first "accidental death" was this would never happen again. But hope is not action. Today, traffic injures as many as 50 million and kills over one million people ever year. It is, however, no accident that tragedies like these are "accidents" rather than "sacrifices," as such language softens criticism of the moral, social and ecological crises arising from the current global consumptive order. Tales of the miracles of modern science could fill all of the world's cathedrals. Just four decades ago, to choose a random example, South African surgeon Christiaan Barnard performed the first human heart transplant on Louis Washkansky, turning the tragic death of 25-year old Denise Ann Darvall by a speeding car into what the December 1967 issue of Time magazine called her "great favor to humanity." n1 Who, meeting Mr. Washkansky days later, could dispute the wonders of our collective progress? Yet, in a world where surgeons now routinely transplant hearts, on average 19 children under the age of five still die every minute from preventable and treatable causes -- ticking to a grim total of over 10 million every year. Unhealthy environments aggravate illnesses that kill nearly half of these children each year. n2 Diarrhea alone kills more than one-and-a half million children a year. n3 Each year, millions of people also die violently: in 2000, there were over 800,000 suicides, 500,000 homicides and 300,000 deaths in wars. n4 The biggest cause of violent deaths, however, is the one behind Denise Darvall's favor to humanity: traffic collisions, which kill over one million people a year. . Why, with so many medical and technical advances over the last few decades, do so many people still die prematurely? Is it genetic fate? Or bad luck? No doubt some of these deaths are beyond our control, a simple result of living. Far too often, though, the direct causes are from utterly unnecessary dangers -- avoidable "accidents" or curable diseases. Why, it seems reasonable to inquire, are polities unable or unwilling to create safer environments for the world's young? Is this not the moral duty of mature adults? Should this not transcend religion? Ethnicity? Nationality? Sovereignty? The explanation for our collective failure, I think, lies not with the behavior of a few callous politicians and corporate executives. Such actions are mere symptoms of a system-wide failure. The explanation lies instead in the processes and structures of a globalizing political economy of ever-rising consumption. This economy feeds the luxuries of a wealthy minority by degrading the environments of the poor majority -- making these environments unsafe and unhealthy. It disproportionately transfers the ecological costs and social risks to vulnerable peoples and places (including consuming resources essential for the wellbeing of future generations). And it justifies a world where global governance focuses on the needs of capitalism and national security rather than on the safety of those truly at risk of dying young. The result in practice is a global morality that treats the loss of millions of young people every year as little more than tragic accidents, inevitable, natural even, a Darwinian outcome of choice, circumstance, and, ultimately, economic growth. These consequences are, in a possibly blasphemous metaphor muddling the language of the past and present, the sacrifices to the gods of progress in an era of globalization. There is, however, a reason we call these consequences "accidents" rather than "sacrifices," as such soft language helps avoid taking a hard look at the guts of global morality in an era of consumptive prosperity.

#### Reject the way the 1AC frames the problem in favor of an interrogation of consumptive practices — before we can go about fixing the world, we have to start off with an examination of the self, and how we are all personally implicated.

Nayar, 99 (Jayan, Warwick Law, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall)

Rightly, we are concerned with the question of what can be done to alleviate the sufferings that prevail. But there are necessary prerequisites to answering the "what do we do?" question. We must first ask the intimately connected questions of "about what?" and "toward what end?" These questions, obviously, impinge on our vision and judgment. When we attempt to imagine transformations toward preferred human futures, we engage in the difficult task of judging the present. This is difficult not because we are oblivious to violence or that we are numb to the resulting suffering, but because, outrage with "events" of violence aside, processes of violence embroil and implicate our familiarities in ways that defy the simplicities of straightforward imputability. Despite our best efforts at categorizing violence into convenient compartments--into "disciplines" of study and analysis such as "development" and "security" (health, environment, population, being other examples of such compartmentalization) -- the encroachments of order(ing) function at more pervasive levels. And without doubt, the perspectives of the observer, commentator, and actor become crucial determinants. It is necessary, I believe, to question this, "our," perspective, to reflect upon a perspective of violence which not only locates violence as a happening "out there" while we stand as detached observers and critics, but is also one in which we are ourselves implicated in the violence of ordered worlds where we stand very much as participants. For this purpose of a critique of critique, it is necessary to consider the "technologies" of ordering

### Adv

#### Global market prices ensure nickel prices stay low

Frank, 09/10/2013 (Marc, “Low prices take toll on Cuban nickel revenues”, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/10/metals-cuba-nickel-idUSL2N0H61JD20130910)//tdub>

Cuban nickel industry revenues were well below expectations in the first six months of the year, mainly because of low international prices, official radio reported this week.¶ ¶ The provincial radio station of Eastern Holguin province, Radio Angulo, reporting on a visit to Moa municipality by provincial Communist Party leader Luis Torres Iribar, said the municipality's exports were short 26 percent, or $90 million, for the period.¶ ¶ Cuba's only two nickel plants, the Cubaniquel-owned Ernesto Che Guevara plant and the Pedro Soto Alba, a joint venture between Canadian mining company Sherritt International and Cubaniquel, are both located in Moa.¶ ¶ The report said that the Ernesto Che Guevara plant's earnings were 15 percent below expectations, and the Pedro Soto Alba plant was down 25 percent, "mainly due to the low price of the mineral on the world market."

#### The plan doesn’t solve – their author concludes that it only affects the price of nickel production in Cuba and doesn’t change overall demand – plus multiple barriers to solvency they don’t resolve

USITC, THEIR AUTHOR, 1 (U.S. International Trade Commission, “THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF U.S. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CUBA”, USITC Publication 3398, Investigation No. 332-413, February, http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/PUB3398.pdf)

At the same time, ending U.S. sanctions would only be one factor in encouraging foreign investment within the nickel and cobalt sectors in Cuba. Actions would also have to be taken to resolve the legal issues and ownership claims on former U.S. property in Cuba arising from the Helms-Burton Act. Also, according to sources at QNI International, while absence of sanctions would increase the economic viability of the San Felipe project that it is currently evaluating in Cuba, the investment decision also depends on a number of other economic factors, such as the anticipated future demand, the price of nickel and cobalt, the comparative costs of developing competing reserves of these metals elsewhere.

#### Can’t solve warming – hybrid cars still use oil, and most electricity relies on coal which is still dirty fuel

They don’t have a “hybrids spill over” claim – their evidence just says adoption of hybrid cars would be greater but not sufficient – they also don’t solve the entire transportation sector and don’t solve other sectors – their NRDC evidence says that hybrid electric vehicles “Are Part of a Mix of Strategies.”

#### China makes the impact inevitable and they don’t model

Downs, 8

Eric, Fellow @ Brookings, China Energy Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, China’s Energy Policies and Their Environmental Impacts, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0813\_china\_downs.aspx

China suffers from a disconnect between the increasingly prominent position of energy issues on its domestic and foreign policy agendas and the capacity of the country’s institutions to manage the energy sector. Some Chinese commentators have even argued that the biggest threat to China’s energy security is posed by the very institutions responsible for enhancing it. Consequently, restructuring China’s energy policymaking apparatus has been a subject of intense debate in recent years as the country has grappled with an unexpected surge in energy demand, growing dependence on energy imports, rising global energy prices and periodic domestic energy supply shortages. Authority over China’s energy sector at the national level is fractured among more than a dozen government agencies, the most important of which is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Within the NDRC itself, responsibility for energy is similarly scattered among multiple departments. Prior to the restructuring in March 2008, the key component was the Energy Bureau, which had a broad mandate but lacked the authority, tools and manpower to fulfill it. In 2005, the government added another cook to the kitchen with the establishment of the National Energy Leading Group, an advisory body headed by Premier Wen Jiabao. While the leading group’s creation reflected recognition of the need to strengthen energy sector management, it did not eradicate China’s energy governance woes. China’s fragmented energy policymaking structure has impeded energy governance because there is no single institution, such as a Ministry of Energy, with the authority to coordinate the interests of the various stakeholders. For example, the implementation of energy laws is hampered by the fact that those laws often do not specify the government agencies responsible for implementation because of disputes over who should be in charge. Similarly, the fuel tax that the NPC approved in 1999 has not been implemented because of the failure of the relevant stakeholders to reach an agreement. The policy paralysis within the energy bureaucracy stands in sharp contrast to the activism of China’s state-owned energy companies. These firms are powerful and relatively autonomous actors. Their influence is derived from their full and vice ministerial ranks, the membership of some top executives in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, industry expertise, internationally listed subsidiaries and profitability (at least until recently). More often than not, it is China’s energy firms who initiate major energy projects and policies that are later embraced by the government, such as the West-East Pipeline and the acquisition of foreign energy assets. The companies also have some capacity to advance corporate interests at the expense of national ones. For example, oil and power generating companies have periodically reduced their output to pressure the government to raise the state-set prices of refined products and electricity, which have not kept pace with increases in the market-determined prices of crude oil and coal. Similarly, China’s national oil companies have ignored guidance from the central government about where they should invest overseas. II. China’s “new” energy policymaking structure The recent changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus are the latest in a series of institutional reforms aimed at improving energy governance. In March 2008, the NPC approved two additions to China’s energy bureaucracy – the State Energy Commission (SEC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA). The SEC, a high-level discussion and coordination body whose specific functions, organization and staffing have not yet been determined, will replace the National Energy Leading Group. The daily affairs of the SEC will be handled by the NEA, a vice-ministerial component of the NDRC, which is the successor to the NDRC’s Energy Bureau. In addition to the Energy Bureau, the NEA is also comprised of other energy offices from the NDRC, the Office of the National Leading Group, and the nuclear power administration of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. The NEA has a broad mandate, which includes managing the country’s energy industries, drafting energy plans and policies, negotiating with international energy agencies and approving foreign energy investments. The NEA, like its predecessor, will struggle to fulfill its mandate because it lacks the authority, autonomy, manpower and tools to deal with the country’s energy challenges. Although the NEA’s capabilities in each of these areas are greater than those possessed by the NDRC Energy Bureau, they still fall short of what the NEA needs to do its job. Authority: The NEA has more political clout than its predecessor, but not enough to mitigate the bureaucratic infighting that undermines energy decision-making. The NEA is a vice-ministerial body, which is a step above that of the Energy Bureau, which was a bureau-level organization. However, the NEA still does not have the authority it needs to coordinate the interests of ministries, commissions and state-owned energy companies. One of the frustrations of officials in the NDRC Energy Bureau was that the energy companies often undercut their authority by circumventing the Bureau to hold face-to-face discussions with China’s senior leadership. The authority of the NEA is somewhat enhanced by the appointment of Zhang Guobao, a Vice-Chairman of the NDRC with full ministerial rank, as head of the NEA. While it was widely expected that Zhang would retire, his new position is a reflection of his substantial energy expertise. Zhang, who has worked at the NDRC since 1983, is a smart and skillful bureaucrat with encyclopedic knowledge of China’s energy sector. He has overseen the development of some of the country’s major infrastructure projects, including the West-East Pipeline, the transmission of electricity from west to east, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and the expansion of Beijing Capital International Airport. Autonomy: The NEA is a creature of the NDRC. Some Chinese media reports speculated that the fact that the NEA’s offices will be separate from those of the NDRC and that the NEA will have its own Party Group – which will give the NEA greater autonomy in managing its affairs, including personnel decisions – are signs of the NEA’s independence. However, the fact that Zhang Guobao – an NDRC “lifer” – is head of the NEA and its Party Group indicates that the NEA’s room to maneuver will be constrained by the NDRC. Moreover, the NEA’s independence is limited by the fact that key tools it needs to effectively manage the energy sector are in the hands of the NDRC. Tools: Arguably the greatest constraint on the NEA’s ability to fulfill its mandate is the fact that is does not possess the authority to set energy prices, which remain the purview of the NDRC’s Pricing Department. The issue of who would end up with the power to determine energy prices was, in the words of Zhang Guobao, a subject of “constant dispute” during the bureaucratic reorganization. Although the NEA can make suggestions about energy price adjustments and should be consulted by the NDRC on any proposed changes, the shots are still being called by the NDRC (and ultimately the State Council, whose approval is needed for any major energy price changes). The fact that the NDRC retained control over energy prices is hardly surprising. The power to set prices is one of the NDRC’s main instruments of macroeconomic control, which it understandably is reluctant to relinquish, especially to a subordinate component which might be tempted to adjust energy prices in ways that run counter to broader NDRC objectives, such as combating inflation. The NEA’s lack of authority over energy prices makes its task of mitigating the current electricity shortages, which are partly rooted in price controls, especially challenging. Electricity prices are set by the state, while coal prices are determined by the market. The failure of electricity price increases to keep pace with soaring coal prices has contributed to the national power shortage because some electricity producers can't afford coal while others are unwilling to operate at a loss. With no pricing power, the NEA has little choice but to resort to administrative measures to achieve an objective that would be more effectively realized by raising and ultimately liberalizing electricity prices. Personnel: The central government is still managing the energy sector with a skeleton crew. Contrary to rumors that the NEA’s staff would be as large as 200, it ended up with just 112 people. This staff quota is certainly larger than that of the NDRC Energy Bureau, which had only 50 people, but it does not represent a major increase in the number of people directly involved in managing the energy sector at the national level. Moreover, some Chinese media reports have speculated that the NEA may face the problem of “too many generals and not enough soldiers” because at least half of the 112 slots at the NEA are for positions at the deputy department head level and above. The Party organ that determines the functions, internal structure and staff quotas for government institutions probably resisted calls for more personnel out of concern that if it approved a large staff for the NEA, then other government bodies would also press for more manpower at a time when the State Council is trying to streamline the bureaucracy. In sum, China’s new energy administration is unlikely to substantially improve energy governance. The organizational changes are tantamount to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Although the energy bureaucracy looks a bit different, its limited capacities remain largely unchanged. Consequently, we can expect to see a continuation of business as usual: conflicts of interest will impede decision-making; the energy companies will remain important drivers of projects and policies; state-set energy prices will continue to contribute to periodic domestic energy supply shortfalls; and the NEA, with no authority to adjust energy prices, probably will resort to “second best” administrative measures to try to eradicate those shortages. The modest tinkering to China’s energy policymaking apparatus unveiled during the March 2008 NPC meeting reflects the conflicts of interest that stymie energy decision-making. Despite widespread recognition among Chinese officials and energy experts of the need to get the country’s energy institutions “right” and the growing chorus of voices calling for the establishment of a Ministry of Energy (MOE), there are powerful ministerial and corporate interests that favor the status quo. The opposition to the creation of a MOE, a hot topic of debate in Chinese energy circles in recent years, was led by the NDRC and the state-owned energy companies. The mere specter of a MOE strikes fear in the heart of the NDRC because it would deprive the NDRC of a substantial portion of its portfolio and important tools of macroeconomic control. The NDRC’s aversion is shared by the energy firms who are reluctant to have another political master and afraid that a MOE would limit their direct access to China’s leadership. Such opposition helps explain why the government was unable to forge a consensus in favor of more robust changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus. Implications for the United States First, US policymakers should recognize that China’s fractured energy policymaking apparatus may constrain the Chinese government from doing all that US policymakers would like it to do – and indeed what Chinese leaders themselves might want to do – to enhance international energy security and combat climate change. If China falls short of our expectations it may not reflect a conscious decision by Beijing to shirk its global responsibilities but rather the limited capacity of its national energy institutions to bend other actors, notably firms and local governments, to its will.

#### China key to solving emissions

Chen et al., 10Chen, Qian, Peridas, Qiu, Ho: Natural Resources Defense Council, Friedmann: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Li, Wei: Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Sung, Fowler: Clean Air Task Force, Seligsohn, Liu, Forbes: World Resources Institute, Zhang: China Tsinghua University, Zhao: Institute of Engineering Thermophysics, Chinese Academy of Sciences (Jason Chen, Jingjing Qian, George Peridas, Yueming Qiu, Bruce Ho, Julio Friedmann, Xiaochun Li, Ning Wei, S. Ming Sung, Mike Fowler, Deborah Seligsohn, Yue Liu, Sarah Forbes, Dongjie Zhang, Lifeng Zhao, December 2010, “Identifying Near-Term Opportunities For Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) in China,” <http://docs.nrdc.org/international/files/int_10121001a.pdf)//DR>. H

Coal—the most carbon-laden of the three major fossil fuels (i.e., natural gas, crude oil, and coal)—supplies nearly 70 percent of China’s energy. China’s heavy reliance on this fuel is reflected by the fact that during the last five years the country has accounted for nearly fourfifths of the global growth in coal consumption.8 In 2008, China consumed more coal than North and South America, the European Union, Russia, the Middle East, and Africa combined (see Figure 2.1). Heavy reliance on coal has sharply driven up China’s CO2 emissions. In 1994, China emitted 3.07 billion tons, or gigatons (Gt), of CO2. A decade later, in 2004, China’s CO2 emissions stood 60 percent higher, at over 5 Gt a year.9 As a result, China’s annual CO2 emissions now exceed those of the United States.10 With its CO2 emissions surging nearly eight times faster than in the rest of the world (see Figure 2.2), China has a pivotal role to play in the global effort to prevent the worst impacts of global warming from occurring.11

#### Environmental apocalypticism causes eco-authoritarianism and mass violence against those deemed environmental threats – also causes political apathy which turns case

**Buell 3** (Frederick Buell, cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books; “From Apocalypse To Way of Life,” pg. 185-186)

Looked at critically, then, **crisis discourse** thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a **political liability** almost as much as an asset. It calls up a **fierce and effective opposition** with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too **vulnerable to refutation by events**. It also **exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters** and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a “**total solution**” to the problems involved— a phrase that, as an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third Reich’s infamous “**final solution**.”55 A total crisis of society—environmental crisis at its gravest—threatens to translate despair into **inhumanist authoritarianism**; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same timeit **depoliticizes people**, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals; this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn one’s back on the environment. This means, preeminently, turning one’s back on “nature”—on traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, **people need to delink from nature** and live in postnature—a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. Explorations of how deeply “nature” has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to **further indifference** to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisis—with 1960s- and 1970s-style environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one does not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place. The apocalyptic mode had a number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and with (often, though not always) the need for immediate “**total solution**.” **Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode; eco-authoritarianism** was a grave temptation; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off ties to clearly terminal “nature.”

#### That causes mass wars

Brzoska 8 (Michael Brzoska, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg; “The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security,” Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Convention, 2008)

In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round ‘exceptionalism’ in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards ‘security experts’ (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on ‘what to do’. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus leading to arms races.

#### Their apocalyptic warming focus trades off with environmentalism – turns its own end

**Crist, 7** (Eileen Crist, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse”, http://journal.telospress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/2007/141/29.full.pdf+html)

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge ever 1964 work, an entire socio-cultural-economic life—from (actual or aspired to) ways of eating and lodging, transportation, entertainment, or emoting and thinking—“binds the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, to the whole.” Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon, 1991), p. 12. Horkheimer and Adorno traced the origins of the collective’s participation in its own domination to the “historical” moment that magical control over nature (and over the deities of nature) was relinquished to a specific elite or clique in exchange for self and social preservation. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1972), pp. 21–22. After the decisive turn when the social body became implicated in its own domination, “what is done to all by the few, always occurs as the subjection of individuals by the many: social repression always exhibits the masks of repression by a collective” (ibid.). And elsewhere: “The misplaced love of the common people for the wrong which is done them is a greater force than the cunning of the authorities” (ibid., p. 134). In light of such astute observations offered by critical theorists, neo-Marxist and anarchist analyses that indict corporate and/or state power for the troubled natural and social worlds are, at best, only partially true. 20. More than thirty years ago, environmental philosopher Arne Naess articulated the influential distinction between “shallow” and “deep” ecology, characterized by the focus on symptoms of the environmental crisis, on the one hand, versus critical attention to underlying causes of problems, on the other. Notwithstanding its unfortunate elitist overtones—implying that some environmental thinkers are capable of reflecting deeply, while others flounder with superficialities—the shallow-deep distinction has been significant for two compelling reasons. One, it clarified how “symptomology” leads merely to technical piecemeal solutions; and two, it showed how underlying causes, left unaddressed, eventually generate more nasty symptoms. In other words, shallow ecological thinking is technical and narrow: when we think about climate change as “the problem”—as opposed to confronting the limitless expansionism of the capitalist enterprise as the problem—we arguably become shallow in our thinking. Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long- Range Ecology Movements,” in George Sessions, ed., Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (1973; Boston: Shambhala, 1995), pp. 151–55. on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

#### Only by rejecting security can we reconstitute our relationship to the environment through ethical and local justifications

Deudney 90 (Daniel Deudney, assistant professor of political science at John Hopkins’; “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” Millenium – Journal of International Studies 1990, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-372-2011-S3\_IEP/Syllabus/EReadings/07.2/07.2.Deudney1990The-Case.pdf, pg. 469)

Fortunately, environmental awareness **need not depend upon co-opted national security thinking**. Integrally woven into ecological concerns are a powerful set of interests and values—most notably human health and property values, religions and ethics, and natural beauty and concern for future generations. Efforts to raise awareness of environmental problems can thus connect directly with these strong, basic, and diverse human interests and values as **sources of motivation and mobilization**. Far from needing to be bolstered by national security mindsets, a "green" sensibility can make strong claim to being the master metaphor for an emerging postindustrial civilization. Instead of attempting to gain leverage by appropriating national security thinking, environmentalists can gain much more political leverage by continuing to develop and disseminate this immensely rich and powerful worldvie ¶ Earth Nationalism ¶ Transposing existing national security thinking and approaches to environmental politics is likely to be both **ineffective**, and to the extent effective, **counterproductive**. But the story should not end with this negative conclusion. Fully grasping the ramifications of the emerging environmental problems requires a **radical rethinking** and reconstitution of many of the major institutions of industrial modernity, including the nation. The nation and the national, as scholars on the topic emphasize, are complex phenomena because so many different components of identity have become conflated with or incorporated into national identities. Most important in Western constructions of national identity have been ethnicity, religion, language, and war memories. However, one dimension of the national—identification with place—has been underappreciated, and this dimension opens important avenues for reconstructing identity in ecologically appropriate ways. Identification with a particular physical place, what geographers of place awareness refer to as "geopiety" and "topophilia," has been an important component of national identity.35 As Edmund Burke, the great philosopher of nationalism, observed, the sentimental attachment to place is among the most elemental widespread and powerful of forces, both in humans and in animals. In the modern era the nation-state has sought to shape and exploit this sentimental attachment. ¶ With the growth of ecological problems, this sense of place and threat to place takes on a new character. In positing the "bioregion" as the appropriate unit for political identity, environmentalists are recovering and redefining topophilia and geopiety in ways that subvert the state-constructed and state-supporting nation. Whether the bioregion is understood as a particular locality defined by ecological parameters, or the entire planet as the only naturally autonomous bioregion, environmentalists are asserting what can appropriately be called "earth nationalism." 36 This construction of the nation has radical implications for existing state and international political communities. This emergent earth nationalism is radical both in the sense of returning to fundamental roots, and in posing a fundamental challenge to the state-sponsored and defined concept of nation now hegemonic in world politics. It also entails a **powerful and fresh way to conceptualize environmental protection** as the practice of national security.

#### Thesis claim: desire lacks as a result of the structure of language on the speaking organism – the aff is an attempt at providing a palliative to the ills of the social order which results only in scapegoating and political failure

Edkins 3 (Jenny, U of Wales Aberystwyth, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, p. 11-14)//LA \*\*\*Pronoun replacements by ||| in the text.

In the psychoanalytic account the subject is formed around a lack, and in the face of trauma. We become who we are by finding our place within the social order and family structures into which we are born. That social order is produced in symbolic terms, through language. Language does not just name things that are already there in the world. Language divides up the world in particular ways to produce for every social grouping what it calls 'reality'. Each language - each symbolic or social order has its own way of doing this. Crucially, none of these |||social orders||| are complete; none of them can find a place for everything. This is a logical limitation, not a question of a symbolic or social order being insufficiently developed. Completeness or closure is impossible. There is always, inevitably, something that is missed out, something that cannot be symbolised, and this is one part of what psychoanalytic theory calls 'the real'. In its birth into the symbolic or social order, into language, the subject is formed around, and through a veiling of, that which cannot be symbolized the traumatic real. The real is traumatic, and has to be hidden or forgotten, because it is a threat to the imaginary completeness of the subject. The 'subject' only exists in as far as the person finds their place within the social or symbolic order. But no place that the person occupies as a mother, friend, consumer, activistcan fully express what that person is. There is always something more. Again, this is not a question of people not fitting into the roles available for them and a call for more person-friendly societies. Nor does it concern multiple or fragmented identities in a postmodern world. It is a matter of a structural impossibility. If someone is, say, a political activist, there is always the immediate question of whether they are sufficiently involved to count as an activist: don't activists have to be more committed, to take part in more than just demonstrations, shouldn't they stand for office? On the other hand, are they perhaps more than an activist does that description do justice to what they are, to their role in the party? There is always an excess, a surplus, in one direction or the other. However, we choose on the whole to ignore this - to forget this impossibility, and to act as if completeness and closure were possible. We hide the traumatic real, and stick with the fantasy of what we call social reality. As I have argued elsewhere, the political is that which enjoins us not to forget the traumatic real but rather to acknowledge the constituted and provisional nature of what we call social reality. Politics refers to the sphere of activity and institutions that is called 'politics' as opposed to 'economics' or 'society'. Politics is part of what we call social reality. It exists within the agendas and frameworks that are already accepted within the social order. The political, in its 'properly traumatic dimension', on the other hand, concerns the real. It refers to events in which politics of the first sort and its institutions are brought into being. This can be the day-to-day production and reproduction of the social and symbolic order. This continual process has to take place; the social order is not natural, it doesn't exist unless it is produced continually. The political also takes place at moments when major upheavals occur that replace a preceding social and legal system and set up a new order in its place. At such points, the symbolism and ideology that concealed the fragile and contingent nature of authority collapse altogether and there is a brief interregnum before the new order imposes a different form of concealment. The way that time figures in the psychoanalytic account is interesting. A certain non-linearity is evident: time no longer moves unproblematically from past through present to future. In a sense, subjects only retrospectively become what they already are - they only ever will have been. And the social order too shares this retroactive constitution. The subject and the social order in which the subject finds a place are both in a continual process of becoming. Neither exists as a fixed entity in the present moment, as the common-sense view in western culture mightlead us to expect. Both are always in the process of formation. This is because the two are so intimately related. The person is formed, not through a process of interaction with the social order (since that would mean thinking of the social as already there), but by imagining or supposing that the social order exists. This supposing by the individual is what brings the social into being. We have to imagine that others will respond to us before we speak, but it is only our speaking, of course, that enables them to respond. But supposing that the social exists does not only produce the social order, it also, simultaneously, brings the individual into existence too. When our speaking elicits a response, we recognise ourselves as subjects in that response. This recognition is belated when viewed through the lens of a linear temporality: it is not at the moment we decide to speak that we see who we are, but only a moment later, when we get a response. The response tells us not who we are now, since we are no longer that - we have already changed. It tells us who we were, at the moment when we spoke. This is the sense in which we never are, we only ever will hazy been. Like the distant stars, whose past we know from the light that has taken millions of years to reach us but whose present we can only guess at, we can only know what we were, not what we are. And even that is also a guess, of course. In a similar way, when we listen to a sentence being spoken, we can predict what is being said, but we cannot be sure we were right until the sentence is completed and over. Some forms of speech - rhetoric and jokes for example - play on that unpredictability. The uncertainty and unpredictability that this involves can be unsettling. In the rational west, we tend to seek certainty and security above all. We don't like not knowing. So we pretend that we do. Or that if we don't we could, given sufficient scientific research effort and enough money. We forget the uncertainties involved and adopt a view that what we call social reality - which Slavoj Zizek calls social fantasy -- is basically knowable. We adopt an ontology– a view of being and the nature of things - that depends on a progressive linear notion of time. Things can 'be' in our modern western sense only in the context of this temporality. They 'are' because they have a history in time, but they are at the same time separate from that history. But central to this solution to doubt is forgetting, as we have seen. The fantasy is only convincing if, once it has been put in place, we can forget that it is a fantasy. What we are forgetting some would say deliberately - is the real, that which cannot be symbolised, and that which is produced as an excess or surplus by any attempt at symbolisation. We do not remember the trauma that lies at the root of subjectivity, the lack or gap that remains, even within what we call social reality. This position leads to a depoliticisation. We forget that a complete, non-antagonistic society is impossible. We strive for completion and closure, often at any price. There are a number of ways in which this is done, according to Zizek.'' The first is communitarian attempts to produce a close homogeneous society arche-politics. Political struggle disappears because everyone agrees on everything. 'The second, most common in the liberal west, Zizek calls para-politics. Here the political is replaced by politics. Standardised competition takes place between accepted political parties according to pre-set rules, the prize being a turn at executive control of the state bureaucracy. Politics has become policing or managerial control. In the third meta-politics, political conflict is seen as a shadow theatre, with the important events taking place in another scene, that of economic processes. Politics should be cancelled when economic processes have worked themselves out (as scientific materialism predicts) and matters can be decided by rational debate and the collective will. Finally, we have ultra-politics, where political struggle becomes warfare, and the military are called in. There is no common ground for debate and politics is militarised. If we are to resist such attempts to 'gentrify' or depoliticise the political we have to recall the constituted, provisional and historically contingent nature of every social order, of every ontology. This position, which Zizek calls 'traversing the fantasy', 'tarrying with the negative' or fidelity to the ontological crack in the universe, is uncomfortable." It involves an acceptance of the lack of trauma at the centre of the subject and the non-existence of any complete, closed social order.

#### This only perpetuates university discourse – actually prevents action to “solve” warming, whatever that means

Bryant 13 (Levi R., Collin College, TX, The Intentional Stance and the Functional Stance, 9/18/13, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/09/18/the-intentional-stance-and-the-functional-stance/)//LA

Do we need to believe in anthropogenic climate change? I pose this question, of course, to be provocative as I do think it’s useful to believe in things like anthropogenic climate change. However, the point of posing the question is to draw attention to how a lot of us academics think and what intellectual movements such as actor-network theory and the new materialisms and realisms might bring to the table at the level of political strategy. A lot of us seem to think that our political work consists in persuading others to believe certain things. People must be persuaded to believe that neoliberal economic philosophy pervades all aspects of contemporary life (true). People must be persuaded to believe that current climate change is caused by human activity (true). Etc., etc., etc. The idea seems to be that if people have the right theory about the world or the correct set of propositional attitudes, then they’ll modify their action accordingly and do the right thing. Let’s call this the intentional attitude. The premise of the intentional attitude or intentionalism is that since action is based on belief or propositional attitudes, persuasion is a key component of political activism. The intentional attitude can be contrasted with the functional attitude. The functional attitude doesn’t deny that people have intentions and that these intentions play a significant role in why they do what they do, but it notes that functionally much of what our action produces has very little to do with what we intend in our action. For example, as I write this post I intend to persuade and convey certain ideas; however, functionally I am also contributing to the reproduction of the English language (and am probably making it worse!). When I go to the supermarket to get food for dinner I do so because I intend to feed myself, but I am also contributing to the reproduction of agrocapitalism. A lot of work in Continental political thought is undertaken for the sake of various emancipatory projects (intentional stance), but because it ends up accessible only to other expert level academics it functionally just reproduces university discourse, the tenure system, and contributes to the publication of new journal issues. In Latour’s famous example, we slow down for the cement speed bump not because of any particular belief we have about speed laws, but because of how the speed bump functions. Things that happen at the level of functionality are independent of beliefs and intentions, but contribute to why we act as we do all the same. From a functional standpoint, let’s look at intentionalist strategies again. My strategy is to persuade my interlocutor that climate change is human caused so that they will take action against these causes and support things like reducing carbon emissions and whatnot. That’s my intention. But looks at what happens. Now a massive debate goes on between the climate change denier and the person defending anthropogenic climate change theories. The denier wins either way, because functionally we end up discussing the issue to death rather than taking action. In continuing to debate we’re still doing nothing even though that’s not our intention to debate.

## 2NC

### 2NC AT: FW

**Focusing on policy-making first absolves individual contribution and cedes the political – ensures their impacts are inevitable and provides an independent reason to vote negative**

**Trennel 6** (Paul Trennel, Ph. D from the University of Wales, Department of International Politics; “The (Im)possibility of Environmental Security,” September 2006, http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/410/trenellpaulipm0060.pdf?sequence=2)

Thirdly, it can be claimed that the security mindset channels the obligation to address environmental issues in an unwelcome direction. Due to terms laid out by the social contract “security is essentially something done by states…there is no obligation or moral duty on citizens to provide security…In this sense security is essentially empty…it is not a sign of positive political initiative” (Dalby, 1992a: 97-8). Therefore, casting an issue in security terms puts the onus of action onto governments, creating a docile citizenry who await instructions from their leaders as to the next step rather than taking it on their own backs to do something about pressing concerns. This is unwelcome because governments have limited incentives to act on environmental issues, as their collectively poor track record to date reveals. Paul Brown notes that “at present in all the large democracies the short-term politics of winning the next election and the need to increase the annual profits of industry rule over the long term interests of the human race” (1996: 10; see also Booth 1991: 348). There is no clearer evidence for this than the grounds on which George W. Bush explained his decision to opt out of the Kyoto Protocol: “I told the world I thought that Kyoto was a lousy deal for America…It meant that we had to cut emissions below 1990 levels, which would have meant I would have presided over massive layoffs and economic destruction” (BBC: 2006). The short-term focus of government elites and the long-term nature of the environmental threat means that any policy which puts the burden of responsibility on the shoulders of governments should be viewed with scepticism as this may have the effect of breeding inaction on environmental issues. Moreover, governmental legislation may not be the most appropriate route to solving the problem at hand. If environmental vulnerabilities are to be effectively addressed “[t]he routine behaviour of practically everyone must be altered” (Deudney, 1990: 465). In the case of the environmental sector it is not large scale and intentional assaults but the cumulative effect of small and seemingly innocent acts such as driving a car or taking a flight that do the damage. Exactly how a legislative response could serve to alter “non-criminal apolitical acts by individuals” (Prins, 1993: 176- 177) which lie beyond established categories of the political is unclear. Andrew Dobson has covered this ground in claiming that the solution to environmental hazards lies not in piecemeal legislation but in the fostering of a culture of “ecological citizenship”. His call is made on the grounds that legislating on the environment, forcing people to adapt, does not reach the necessary depth to produce long-lasting change, but merely plugs the problem temporarily. He cites Italian “car-free city” days as evidence of this, noting that whilst selected cities may be free of automobiles on a single predetermined day, numbers return to previous levels immediately thereafter (2003: 3). This indicates that the deeper message underlying the policy is not being successfully conveyed. Enduring environmental solutions are likely to emerge only when citizens choose to change their ways because they understand that there exists a pressing need to do so. Such a realisation is unlikely to be prompted by the top-down, state oriented focus supplied by a security framework.

Affirmative cannot win that they have any practical effects

Schlag 90 (Pierre, Stanford LR, November, Lexis)

In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it. For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle n31 into effect, or to restructure [\*179] the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should. . . ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students -- persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.

### 2NC AT: CTP

**They ignore all of the other avenues for social change in a myopic rush to seek state-centered solutions**

Weissberg, 4 (Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of Illinois-Urbana Robert Weissberg is., Society “Abandoning Politics,” May/June,http://transactionpub. metapress.com/app/home/content.asp)

The conventional wisdom tells us that Americans are generally politically apathetic and, judging by re- cent voting trends this situation may be deteriorating. **Self-appointed civic guardians predictably express profound unease about this disengagement and offer up a plethora of remedies**, everything from user-friendly ballots to electronic versions of democracy to reenergize political life. **Academics seem especially alarmed that apathy will impede impoverished minorities** from climbing up the socio-economic ladder **while allowing “special interest” to ride roughshod over the common good. Alas, these discussions are quite superficial and misdirected**. At most, those damning apathy glibly offer unproven clichés about “rising alienation” and similar banalities as if Americans were suddenly paralyzed to shape the world around them. Laments about lethargy fail to grasp that this disengagement only reflects a shift in choice of weapons, not laziness. **Those grumbling about idle parents reluctant to pressure government for better schools incorrectly assume that rejecting politics will necessarily guarantee shoddy education**. Ditto for those who seem “indifferent” about crime, the environment, high taxes and just about all other maladies—misery awaits those who sit on the sidelines. Reality is more nuanced and, critically, this reflexive bewailing of apathy reflects a state centered view of progress so, ipso facto, political disengagement preordains failure. **Fortunately, the United States is not a totalitarian system in which the government is the only game in town. This myopic focus on state-centered solutions also obscures an important emerging fact. To the extent that abandoning politically directed remedies is not ideologically uniform, the civic landscape will soon be profoundly altered.** In a nut- shell, the Left with its deep commitment to political solutions will continue to dominate policy-making while the nation as a whole quietly moves rightward.

### 2NC AT: Perm

**The permutation still links—it includes the plan and its attendant macropolitical focus—both of which are direct links to our argument per the 1NC Bobertz evidence and this new card:**

Princen, Maniates and Conca(Thomas Princen, Michael Maniates, and Ken Conca, July 2002, Confronting Consumption)

How might ordinary people living in high-consumption societies begin to clarify and act on these unsettling intuitions? Where can they turn for insight, systematic analysis, support, intervention strategies, or hope of effective action? Certainly not to the policymaking arena. There one finds processes of thought and decision dominated, perhaps as never before, by two forces: a deeply seated economistic reasoning and a politics of growth that cuts across the political spectrum. According to prevailing economistic thought, consumption is nothing less than the Purpose of the economy. Economic activity is separated into supply and demand, and demand-that is, consumer purchasing behavior-is relegated to the black box of consumer sovereignty. The demand function is an aggregation of individual preferences each set of which is unknowable and can only be expressed in revealed form through market purchases. Thus analytic and policy attention is directed to production-that is, to the processes of supplying consumers with what they desire.

### 2NC AT: Econ good

**Framing the environment in terms of the economy makes collapse inevitable**

**Weiskel 97** (Timothy - Research Director @ the Cambridge Climate Research Associates – PhD in Anthropology from Oxford, “Selling Pigeons in the Temple:

The Danger of Market Metaphors in an Ecosystem”, Harvard Seminar on Environmental Values, <http://www.ecoethics.net/OPS-008.HTM>) //MD

The natural order of the world and our role within it is affirmed by market enthusiasts and politicians alike to be an inevitable manifestation of the ongoing logic of an economy of unending, capitalist accumulation. In recent electoral history, politicians took pride in mouthing the simple syllogism, "it's the economy, stupid!" -- as if the only significant role of political leadership was to "grow the economy." Whether we like it or not -- whether we fully know it or not -- this entire worldview is subconsciously enlisted whenever we surrender to the use of market metaphors in devising public policy. It is no wonder that in this framework it is impossible to formulate effective environmental policy to protect biodiversity. Such a worldview arbitrarily restricts the notion of what is possible to what is profitable. Market metaphors truncate the range of policy options open to environmental leaders, and the vocabulary and images these metaphors generate completely fail to capture what we humans value most about our rich and complex world of everyday human experience. The insidious thought control exercised by market metaphors in the public discourse needs to be squarely confronted and firmly rejected. Only by stepping outside the make-believe world of these market metaphors is it possible to see why they mystify rather than clarify our environmental circumstance. Essentially, market metaphors are based on a logical fallacy that projects a fundamental falsification of reality. Despite frequent appeals to the "real world," market advocates live in a self-contained world of abstract modeling, statistical fantasies and paper currency that serves as a proxy measure of wealth. In fact, the real world is quite a different place, consisting of the physical parameters of all life forms that can be measured in terms of meters from sea-level, metric tons of gas emissions and degrees of temperature variation. The human economy needs to be understood as a subset of this physical ecosystem and not the other way around. Environmental policy based on an inverted representation of reality cannot help but fail in the long run. It is for this reason that economism -- the belief that principles of market economics can and should always be used to resolve environmental public policy dilemmas -- represents such a palpable failure of political leadership. Further, the attempt to substitute economism for meaningful public policy constitutes a blatant abdication of the public trust. This tragic abdication of the public trust through the relentless pursuit of economism has fueled the current righteous indignation of global citizens sensitive to the environment and concerned about the prospect of human survival. Politicians under the spell of economism fail to grasp what growing numbers of decent citizens sense and seek to affirm from a very deep level of conviction, and that is simply this: biodiversity must be saved for its intrinsic, expressive, and relational value -- not simply for the momentary advantage it may yield in some economist's cost-benefit calculations. If global policy makers do not free themselves from the trap of market mantras, their claim to leadership will be seen to be vacuous and illegitimate in the long run. This will be so because misplaced market metaphors cannot help but prove fatal in mediating human relationships with the environment. Taken together they have the power to drive industrial civilization into the sad syndrome of "overshoot-and-collapse" so often characteristic of failed economies of accumulation throughout human history. Unless radically different forms of valuation can be rediscovered, unless public leaders can learn to embrace and articulate them, and unless these leaders can then proceed to formulate effective public policy based on these new values to change collective human behavior, we will witness the demise of industrial society as the unavoidable outcome of "business as usual."

In short, public leadership needs now to define, declare and defend the public good in terms that transcend private self-interest. There are no doubt connections between the public good and private gain, but to justify the former exclusively in terms of the latter is a fundamental mistake of moral reasoning. Without political leadership that can understand this fundamental difference and learn to defend the public good in its own right, industrial civilization will become irretrievably consumed in a scramble for private profit and personal advantage in a dismal world of diminishing resources. The Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, expressed this fear with a rivetting sense of urgency in his opening remarks at the Earth Summit Plus Five conference in New York.(6) Failure to act now could damage our planet irreversibly, unleashing a spiral of increased hunger, deprivation, disease and squalor. Ultimately, we could face the destabilising effects of conflict over vital natural resources....We must not fail. In past epochs individual religious and spiritual figures emerged to warn society of this kind of impending doom. Prophets of old inveighed against gluttonous consumption based on inequity and iniquity, and they warned societies of the physical consequences of failing to mend their ways. Perhaps more importantly, they served to remind societies of the natural order of the created world and the proper place for humankind within it. Amos, Jesus of Nazareth and Mohammed of Medina all arose in the ancient near east with strikingly parallel messages in this regard. Jews, Christians and Muslims to this day retain scriptural traditions which remind them that the earth does not ultimately belong to humans, nor will their mistreatment of the earth or their fellow creatures go unpunished. In these religious traditions arrogant, self-centered behavior with regard to the created order is thought to be morally wrong, however expedient or profitable it may prove to be for individuals in the short run. We are not fully informed by the preserved text, but one suspects that selling pigeons in the temple prompted a sense of moral indignation on the part of Jesus of Nazareth, not because the prices were a bit too high. Rather such activity inspired moral outrage because selling pigeons in the temple involved a fundamental confusion of the market place with sacred space. It is -- perhaps not surprisingly -- the scientists who speak with the prophetic voice of conviction in our day. Physicists like Nobel Laureate Henry Kendall, the late astronomer Carl Sagan, the evolutionary biologist Edward Wilson and renowned "public" scientists like the late oceanographer Jacques Cousteau now provide us with the clarion call to awareness and action that parallels the prophetic message of old. In a document entitled World Scientists' Warning to Humanity the Union of Concerned Scientists representing more than one hundred Nobel laureates put the message quite plainly:(7) Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course. Human activities inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on the environment and on critical resources. If not checked, many of our current practices put at serious risk the future that we wish for human society and the plant and animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living world that it will be unable to sustain life in the manner that we know. Fundamental changes are urgent if we are to avoid the collision our present course will bring about. It is hard to image a more thorough embodiment of the ancient prophetic tradition. Nevertheless, economists and politicians -- the scribes and Pharisees of our day -- do not yet seem to have understood the point. It is not that their prices are inaccurate -- goodness knows we have some of the world's most clever economists and accountants devoted to the task of assigning nature its cash value. We cannot expect much better on this score. But the issue before us is more fundamental than this. The essential problem is that to approach the issue of biodiversity as if it were an exercise in global bean-counting is fundamentally wrongheaded. It is wrong because it mistakes price for value, proffering market valuations as a proxy surrogate for a meaningful discussion of values. In such a constricted framework there can never be a purposeful debate -- only a mindless, mechanical and endless set of calculations. Given the two-year time frame of the electoral cycle and the pressures to craft policy to please rich and influential interest groups, there are powerful and evident reasons why politicians may well wish to avoid meaningful discussions about values and the environment. In this sense, the alliance between economists and politicians is a marriage of considerable convenience for both partners, but it must be made clear to each of them that this is not acceptable as a mode of public leadership. On this point, scientists and spiritual leaders agree, and it is for this reason that they have joined forces in such impressive numbers to express themselves in terms of the moral obligations facing the human community. The Union of Concerned Scientists has joined with the National Religious Partnership for the Environment to reiterate the prophetic message in churches, temples and mosques across the country and around the world. In a similar vein, research scientists at Harvard have provided strong support for the activities of the Harvard Seminar on Environmental Values convened by the University's Committee on Environment and the Center for the Study of Values in Public Life in order specifically to explore the full range of valuation -- not just economic costs -- which can be drawn upon in developing public policy to protect the environment and biodiversity. The message from spiritual leaders and research scientists alike is as clear as it is forceful: we did not create the world; we cannot control it; we must not destroy it. More precisely: we must not commodify and merchandise biodiversity merely because in the short run it may appear profitable for us to do so. Convinced that we know the price of everything we will soon have lost the ability to value anything that is priceless. The capacity to value some things and human experiences beyond all measure of worldly worth and to esteem them without any thought of their exchange value or sale is surely one of the most cherished attributes that makes us human. To forget this or deny it is to disavow our humanity, and **down that road lies our swift and certain extinction.** The capacity to appreciate intrinsic value is not a quality of humanity that it would be wise to denigrate, dismiss or eliminate in formulating environmental public policy. On the contrary, it may well constitute our last, best hope for survival as a species.

## 1NR

#### Third is scapegoating – the attempt to suture the lack through the presentation of the plan text inevitability runs up against a wall and must find an explanation for such failure – this ensures a replication of domination and oppression

Stavrakakis 99 (Yannis, Prof @ U of Essex, Lacan and the Political, p. 107-8)//LA

In the light of our theoretical framework, fantasy can only exist as the negation of real dislocation, as a negation of the generalised lack, the antagonism that crosses the field of the social. Fantasy negates the real by promising to `realise' it, by promising to close the gap between the real and reality, by repressing the discursive nature of reality's production. Yet any promise of absolute positivity - the construction of an imaginarised false real - is founded on a violent/negative origin; it is sustained by the exclusion of a real - a non-domesticated real which always returns to its place. Sustaining a promise of full positivity leads to a proliferation of negativity. As we have already pointed out, the fantasy of a utopian harmonious social order can only be sustained if all the persisting disorders can be attributed to an alien intruder. Since the realisation of the utopian fantasy is impossible, utopian discourse can remain hegernonically appealing only if it attributes this impossibility -~ that is to say, its own ultimate impossibility -~ to an alien intruder. As Sartre has put it `the anti-Semite is in the unhappy position of having a vital need for the very enemy he wishes to destroy' (Sartre, 1995: 28). The impossibility of the Nazi utopia cannot be incorporated within utopian discourse. This truth is not easy to admit; it is easier to attribute all negativity to the Jew: All that is bad in society (crises, wars, famines, upheavals, and revolts) is directly or indirectly imputable to him. The anti-Semite is afraid of discovering that the world is ill-contrived, for then it would be necessary for him to invent and modify, with the result that man would be found to be the master of his own destinies, burdened with an agonising and infinite responsibility. Thus he localises all the evil of the universe in the Jews Sartre, 1995: 4O)~j ~As Jerrold Post has pointed out, we are always bound to those we hate: `We need enemies to keep our treasured - and idealised - selves intact' (Post, 1996: 28-9). And this for `fear of being free' (Sartre, 1995: 27). The fantasy of attaining a perfect harmonious world, of realising the universal, can only be sustained through the construction/localisation of a certain particularity which cannot be assimilated but, instead, has to be eliminated. There exists then a crucial dialectic between the universal fantasy of utopia and the particularity of the always local - enemy who is posited as negating it. The result of this dialectic is always the same: The tragic paradox of utopianism has been that instead of bringing about, as it promised, a system of final and permanent stability, it gave rise to utter restlessness, and in place of a reconciliation between human freedom and social cohesion, it brought totalitarian coercion. (Talmon, 1971: 95)

it also creates a permanent state of exception as the sovereign holds in its hands the power over all life – this ensures mass atrocity

Agamben 98 – professor of philosophy at university of Verona (Giorgio, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, pg. 139-140)

It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain coun­tries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and pro­vokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicaliry with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of “life devoid of value” (or “life unworthy of being lived”) corre­sponds exactly—even if in an apparently different direction—to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is as if every valorization and every “politicization” of life (which, after all, is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only “sacred life,” and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who its “sacred men” will be. It is even pos­sible that this limit, on which the politicization and the exceprio of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now— in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.